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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a breach of oral contract over the initial sum of $6,800. Plaintiff Michelle
Campbell ("Campbell") is an excellent nurse and Defendant Parkway Surgery Center, LLC
("Parkway") wanted her to join its team when it opened its doors for business. Parkway's prior
Administrator/Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Arthur McCracken ("McCracken") and Director of
Nursing, Nanette Hirschi ("Hirschi"), both of whom helped recruit Campbell on behalf of Parkway,
testified Parkway agreed to pay Campbell's Forgivable Loan Agreement (the "Loan") with Bingham
Memorial Hospital ("BMH") Foundation ("BMH Foundation"), which would become due if
Campbell left her employment with BMH.

In spite of the agreement confirmed by its own employees, Parkway has repeatedly refused
to pay Campbell's Loan to the BMH Foundation. After lengthy discovery, numerous motions, a
bench trial, a ruling that Parkway breached its oral agreement with Campbell, a motion for
reconsideration affirming that Parkway breached its oral agreement, and an appeal to the District
Court again affirming Parkway's breach, Parkway continues to raise any argument it can to avoid
its obligation. The District Court's careful consideration of the evidence and its thorough analysis
of the legal authority should be affirmed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June 2002, Campbell entered into a Loan with the BMH Foundation, which required
Campbell to work for BMH for a set period of time in consideration for payment of $6,800.00
toward Campbell's tuition for her nursing program. (Tr., p. 20, L. 20-p. 25, L. 5; PL Ex. A). The
Loan, dated June 25, 2002, provided that the Loan would be incrementally forgiven if Campbell
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worked for BMH for the period of time specified after obtaining her registered nurse ("RN") degree.
(PL Ex. A). In the Loan, Campbell agreed that if she did not work for BMH as agreed, she would

reimburse the BMH Foundation for the $6,800.00 tuition payment, plus interest. (PL Ex. A).
In approximately April of 2003, while Campbell was employed by BMH, Hirschi, Director

of Nursing for Parkway, approached Campbell to recruit her for a nursing position with Parkway.
(Tr., p. 25, L. 6-p. 26, L. 8; p. 120, L.7-L. 11). Campbell indicated that she was interested but that
in order for her to leave BMH to work for Parkway, the Loan would have to be paid. (Tr., p. 25, L.
6 - p. 26, L. 8; p. 120, L.7 - p. 121, L. 10). At the time, Parkway had just been organized, and the
board was working to set up facilities and hire nurses and other staff members. (Tr., p. 117, L. 14 p. 119, L. 3). Hirschi had previously been Campbell's supervisor at BMH prior to becoming
Director of Nursing for Parkway, and, therefore, knew of Campbell's capabilities as a nurse and
believed Campbell would be a valuable asset for Parkway to have on staff. (Tr., p. 113, L. 16-25).
Campbell also had worked with Parkway's owners, Dr. Robert Lee ("Lee"), Dr. Bret Rogers
("Rogers"), and Dr. Christopher Riley ("Riley"), while she was at BMH. (Tr., p. 122, L. 11-16).
Based upon their prior experiences with Campbell, Lee, Rogers and Riley all knew Campbell was
an excellent nurse and wanted her on Parkway's staff. (Tr., p. 122, L. 11-16).
Prior to recruiting Campbell, Parkway was aware of Campbell's obligation under the Loan
because Hirschi had assisted Campbell in obtaining the Loan with the BMH Foundation while she
was still employed at BMH as Campbell's supervisor. (Tr., p. 114, L. 12 - p. 115, L. 17).
Consequently, when Parkway's board began discussing recruiting Campbell, Hirschi explained
Campbell's Loan and informed Parkway's board that if they wanted to have Campbell work for
2

Parkway, they would need to pay the amounts due under the Loan for Campbell, because working
for Parkway would necessitate leaving BMH prior to Campbell being able to fulfill the requirements
for the Loan to be forgiven. (Tr., p. 122, L. 8 - p. 123, L. 8). Hirschi was aware of the amount of the
Loan and provided that information to the board. (Tr., p. 123, L. 5-8).
A board member commented at the board meeting that, if they recruited Campbell, they may
not have to pay off the Loan because he thought BMH may not attempt to collect from Campbell if
the Loan was not paid. (Tr., p. 123, L. 11-20; p. 141, L. 13-19). Hirschi responded that if Parkway
were to recruit Campbell by promising to pay off her Loan to BMH, then they would need to actually
pay off the Loan as promised. (Tr., p. 123, L. 11-20; p. 141, L. 13-19). The board discussed the
issue further and they agreed that paying Campbell's Loan was necessary to recruit Campbell to
work as a nurse for Parkway. (Tr., p. 124, L. 5-11; p. 144, L. 2-21). McCracken, Parkway's
Administrator/CFO at the time, was also present at the board meeting when the terms of recruitment
of Campbell were discussed and the direction was given to recruit Campbell and pay off her Loan.
(Tr., p. 121, L. 20-24; p. 164, L. 14-21; p. 181, L. 25 - p. 182, L. 9).
As a result of the board's decision to recruit Campbell, in early May 2003, McCracken and
Hirschi held a joint interview with Campbell and Robin Chadburn, another potential employee of
Parkway. (Tr., p. 125, L. 7-16). During the interview, McCracken and Hirschi brought up the issue
ofCampbell'sLoan. (Tr.,p.27,L.3-23;p.126,L.1-4;p.131,L.3-7;p.167,L.22-p.168,L.6).
Campbell explained that the loan was for $6,800. (Tr., p. 28, L. 3-15). McCracken stated that
Parkway would take care of the Loan for Campbell if she would come work for Parkway, and asked
Campbell to bring in the promissory note so Parkway could pay the debt. (Tr., p. 27, L. 3 - p. 28,
3

L. 15; p. 167, L. 22-p. 168, L. 10). Both Hirschi and McCracken testified that "taking care of' the
Loan meant Parkway would pay it. (Tr., p. 137, L. 10-22; p. 182, L. 3-9). Aside from Campbell
quitting her job at BMH and coming to work for Parkway, no other conditions were attached to
Parkway paying off the Loan for Campbell. (Tr., p. 27, L. 13-23; p. 89, L. 5-10; p. 166, L. 2-8; PL
Ex. D). Subsequent to accepting Parkway's offer of employment, and based upon Parkway's
promise to pay off her Loan to the BMH Foundation, Campbell resigned from BMH and began
working for Parkway. Campbell gave a copy of the promissory note and Loan to Parkway. (Tr., p.
27, L. 16-19; p. 168, L. 7-12). After starting employment at Parkway on May 27, 2003, Campbell
wrote a thank you note to Parkway's board, thanking Parkway for taking care of her Loan with the
BMH Foundation and for the opportunity to work at Parkway. (Tr., p. 30, L. 7-14; p. 168, L. 22 p. 169, L. 9). Both the thank you note and promissory note were given to Dave Collette ("Collette"),
who was Parkway's manager at the time. (Tr., p. 30, L.7-14; p. 169, L. 2-4). After giving the thank
you note and promissory note to Parkway, no one from Parkway ever approached Campbell to ask
her why she would be thanking them for paying off her Loan or to tell her that she was mistaken that
Parkway had agreed to pay off her debt to the BMH Foundation. (Tr., p. 30, L. 15-21). Campbell
understood that subsequent to her beginning work at Parkway that Parkway paid off the Loan as
agreed. (Tr., p. 30, L. 22-25). McCracken and Hirschi also understood that Parkway had paid the
Loan as promised. (Tr. p. 127, L. 2-8; p. 172, L. 17 - p. 173, L. 5).
Unbeknownst to Campbell, Parkway did not pay off the Loan with the BMH Foundation as
promised. Campbell did not learn that Parkway failed to pay off the Loan until February of 2005,
when she received a telephone call from BMH asking her to repay the Loan because she was in
4

default. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-23). Campbell was surprised by this call, as she understood that Parkway
had previously paid offher Loan. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 47, L. 2-4). Campbell approached Hirschi
about the non-payment of the Loan. (Tr., p. 37, L. 17-20). Hirschi was shocked that the Loan had
not been paid, as she had also understood it had been paid. (Tr., p. 127, L. 9-16). Campbell and
Hirschi spoke to McCracken about the Loan payment, who also understood it had been paid, and
with Dr. Steve Klippert ("Klippert"), who was Parkway's Administrator at the time. (Tr., p. 37, L.
20-24; p. 173, L. 9-24). Klippert said he would look into the matter. Klippert later informed
Campbell that Parkway had never paid off the Loan to the BMH Foundation. (Tr., p. 38, L. 3-5).
In March 2005, shortly after Campbell received the telephone call from the BMH Foundation

informing her that she was in default and that she needed to pay the Loan back, Parkway was looking
to reduce expenses and had informed its staff that it would be cutting hours and benefits. (Tr., p. 35,
L. 16 - p. 36, L. 20). Hirschi resigned as Director of Nursing. (Tr., p. 38, L. 20). Campbell also

informed Parkway that she intended to resign. (Tr., p. 36, L. 13 - p. 42, L. 12). Campbell received
a telephone call from Rogers after Hirschi resigned, at which time he offered Campbell the position
of interim Director of Nursing, with the promise that she could apply for the Director of Nursing
position. (Tr., p. 38, L. 19-22). Campbell expressed reservations about taking the position because,
at the time, she had only had her RN license for one week. (Tr., p. 38, L. 23 - p. 39, L. 1). Then
Campbell asked Rogers, "What about my loan?" Rogers responded that "maybe" Parkway would
pay off Campbell's Loan ''this time" if she would accept the position she was being offered. (Tr.,
p. 39, L. 2-4; p. 42, L. 6-9). Ultimately, Campbell opted not to accept the interim Director of
Nursing position and resigned from Parkway in early March 2005. (Tr., p. 42, L. 10-12). Campbell
5

sent a demand letter to Parkway from counsel, requesting that Parkway fulfill its promise. (Aug. R.,
Aff. ofDeAnne Casperson, Ex. B). Parkway never paid off her Loan to the BMH Foundation and
Campbell was forced to bring suit against Parkway in 2005. (R., p. 15-21).
The matter was tried before the honorable Robert C. Brower, Magistrate. The Magistrate
Court found in favor of Campbell on her breach of contract claim, against Parkway on its
counterclaim and cross-claim, and determined that Campbell was entitled to attorney's fees and costs
as the prevailing party. (R., p. 87-88).
The Magistrate Court ordered the following relating to the breach of contract:
3.

That the Defendant, Parkway Surgical Center, LLC, is hereby ordered to pay
the amount of $6,800.00 plus any accumulated interest due by Ms. Campbell
on the Forgivable Loan Agreement with "Foundation." This payment shall
be made directly to Ms. Campbell, it being assumed that Ms. Campbell will
tender that amount to "Foundation" to extinguish her obligation with them
and to thus rehabilitate her reputation in the local medical community.

(R., p. 89). Parkway appealed to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the breach of
contract claim but remanded to reform the judgment, finding that Campbell was entitled to specific
performance as was pied in the Second Amended Complaint. (R., p. 237). The District Court also
granted Campbell's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. (R., p. 249). On May 28, 2014, Parkway
appealed the decision of the District Court. (R., p. 281). After two 35-day extensions of time,
Parkway filed its Appellant's Brief untimely. 1

Parkway was ordered by this Court to file its brief"on or before 12-4-2014." Parkway filed
its brief on December 5, 2014. Failure to timely file a brief "may be grounds only for such action or
sanction as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal."
I.A.R. 21. As a result, it is within the discretion of this Court whether Parkway should be sanctioned
in some manner for its untimely filing.
1
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's review of the District Court's decision in its capacity as an appellate court has
been clearly set forth as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure.
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145
Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). This Court does not review the Magistrate Court's
decisions. Id This Court is "procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district
court." Id (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413 n.1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.l (2009)).
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Respondent includes the following additional issues on appeal:
1.

As an alternative basis for affirming the District Court, is Campbell entitled to a damage
award as a result of her economic interest in Parkway's promise to pay off her Forgivable
Loan Agreement?

2.

Is Campbell entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal?
V. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules, Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1), and 12-120(3) in defending Campbell in this appeal. The
Magistrate Court has already determined that Campbell is the prevailing party as against Parkway
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in its Judgment issued on August 14, 2012, (R., p. 92 ) and granted Campbell her attorney's fees and
costs in its Amended Judgment on November 14, 2012. (R., p. 297). The District Court affirmed
the decision by the Magistrate Court and granted attorney's fees and costs on appeal. (R., p. 297).
Campbell has set forth further argument in support of her claims for fees and costs in Section VI, E.

VI. ARGUMENT
A.

CAMPBELL HAS STANDING
1.

Parkway Was Required to Present its Standing Argument to the District Court.

For the first time, Parkway claims in its opening brief that Campbell lacks standing to bring
her breach of contract claim. Generally, a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised for
the first time on appeal. See Blankenship v. Wash. Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292, 295, 281 P .3d 1070,
1073 (2012). However, this is not Parkway's first appeal, but its second. Under the standard of
review, this Court sits as a reviewing Court over the District Court's appellate decision. See Bailey

v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). As a result, this Court is "procedurally
bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court." Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413,415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.1 (2009)). As a result of the procedural restrictions as a secondlevel appellate reviewing Court, Parkway was required to raise its standing argument to the District
Court to preserve it. As a result, the claim should be dismissed.

2.

Parkway Should Be Estopped from Contesting Campbell's Standing When it
Sought the Jurisdiction of the Court on its Counterclaim and Cross-Claim.

Parkway's actions prevent it from asserting that Campbell lacked standing. First, a motion
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) is the avenue for contesting the lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b). Parkway never brought a motion to dismiss contesting
Campbell's standing. Second, in its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Parkway failed to
include as an affirmative defense that Campbell lacked standing. (R., p. 68) A failure to assert an
affirmative defense before trial is generally a bar to raising the issue at a later time. See Guzman v.
Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 935, 318 P.3d 918, 925 (2013). Third, Parkway asserted a counterclaim

against Campbell, admitting that it did have an agreement with Campbell for the repayment of the
Loan, but under different terms than those asserted by Campbell. (R., p. 69-72). In addition,
Parkway asserted a cross-claim against McCracken, claiming he did not have authority to offer
Campbell payment of the Loan. (R., p. 34-35). After losing on its counterclaim and its cross-claim
(R., p. 88-89), Parkway now seeks to contest the jurisdiction of the Court.
Parkway cannot contest the jurisdiction of the Court when it is the defendant, and seek the
jurisdiction of the Court when it is the plaintiff -

all on the basis of a contractual agreement

associated with the repayment of Campbell's Loan. Understandably, Campbell cannot find a single
case where a defendant has both contested standing of the plaintiff in a breach of contract action, and
asserted a counterclaim, admitting that an agreement existed but that the terms were different.
Parkway seeks to take inconsistent positions to suit its purposes in the litigation. It certainly
understood the Magistrate Court had subject matter jurisdiction when it counterclaimed against
Campbell and cross-claimed against McCracken. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel prevents Parkway
from contesting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court. "Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known
as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage
by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position."
9

Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004) (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9th Cir.1996)). As quoted fromRissetto in Sword by this
Court, "[t]he policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of
the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings.... Judicial
estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts .... Because it
is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court
at its discretion." Id Parkway's argument that Campbell did not have standing when it admitted
it had a contractual agreement with her and filed a counterclaim and cross-claim, should be
disregarded by this Court.

3.

As a Party to the Agreement, Campbell Has Standing.

Campbell, as a party to the contract with Parkway, has standing to bring this action to contest
Parkway's breach of contract by its failure to pay Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation. In its
efforts to contest a straightforward breach of contract claim, Parkway asserts Campbell has no
standing, claiming that Campbell suffered no injury from Parkway's refusal to pay a debt she
incurred only as a result of leaving her employment with BMH to work for Parkway. Most
disturbing is Parkway's claim that the District Court on appeal ruled that Campbell was not injured.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13 ("The District Court agreed with this legal mandate and found that
Campbell had not been injured.")). The District Court's first conclusion oflaw was as follows: "l.
Campbell sustained an injury recoverable under contract law." (R., p. 251). The District Court
specifically found that Parkway was liable for the breach of contract and the remedy was specific
performance: "Regardless of whether the applicable statute oflimitations now bars the Foundation
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from suing Campbell on the Forgivable Loan Agreement, Parkway's promise to 'take care of'
Campbell's debt created an enforceable duty which may be remedied by specific performance." (R.,
p. 236). Parkway essentially argues that unless Campbell actually paid off the Loan and incurred
out-of-pocket money damages, she has no standing. Parkway simply ignores the evidence that
Campbell altered her position as a result of Parkway's promise by leaving BMH, which caused her
to incur a repayment obligation of the Loan.
Parkway disregards its contractual relationship with Campbell in its standing analysis, and
instead, claims Campbell has no injury, confusing the injury necessary for standing with the
obligation of proving damages as an element of a claim of breach of contract. "When an issue of
standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who is
seeking relief. Indeed, a party can have standing to bring an action, but then lose on the merits."

Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806, 808, 241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010). Further, Campbell's
demonstration of a breach of contract would entitle her to nominal damages, even if she could not
recover the amount of the Loan or was not entitled to specific performance. See Davis v. Gage, 106
Idaho 735,739,682 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt.
a.
"To satisfy the requirement of standing, a litigant must allege an injury in fact, a fairly
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and a substantial
likelihood that the judicial reliefrequested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Troutner v.

Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). Campbell has both pled and proven
that she has been injured by Parkway's breach of contract. Campbell has consistently alleged that
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Parkway injured her by inducing her to leave her employment with BMH with its promise that
Parkway would pay her debt to the Foundation- a debt that would not have arisen if Campbell had
stayed employed with BMH. Both the Magistrate Court and District Court agreed that Parkway
breached the agreement and Campbell was injured thereby. In her Second Amended Complaint,
Campbell set forth the terms of her agreement with Parkway, Parkway's breach by its failure and
refusal upon demand to pay the debt incurred, and the injury caused to her in incurring a debt. (R.,
p. 54-64). In her prayer for relief, Campbell asked for "a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant
to pay to Bingham Memorial the principal amount of$6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon
judgment, or in the alternative, for a money judgment in the principal amount of$6,800.00 plus an
award of interest in an amount to be determined upon judgment." (R., p. 61). Based on the
pleadings, Campbell has clearly demonstrated privity of contract with Parkway and has alleged an
injury as a result of the breach necessary to establish standing.
Parkway can only make its argument that a person in privity of contract with the opposing
party has no standing to assert a breach of contract claim by ignoring Idaho Supreme Court authority
on standing in the context of a party to a contract. Parkway has not cited to a single case wherein
a party to a contract at issue in the lawsuit did not have standing. Idaho Supreme Court authority has
made it very clear who has standing to enforce the terms of a contract:

It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a
contract. "Privity" refers to "those who exchange the [contractual] promissory words
or those to whom the promissory words are directed. Calemari and Perillo, Contracts
§ 17-1 (2d ed. 1977); see generally 4 Corbin on Contracts § 778 (1951 ). Here,
plaintiffs-appellants are not parties to the prior lease between Montierth and San Tan,
and hence they have no privity and cannot sue to enforce the terms of that prior
contract. A party must look to that person with whom he is in a direct
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contractual relationship for relief, in the event that his expectations under the
contract are not met. Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P .2d 590, 597 (1975);
Minidoka County v. Krieger, 88 Idaho 395, 399 P.2d 962 (1965); Coburn v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 86 Idaho 415,387 P.2d 598 (1963).

Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984) (emphasis added). Campbell
brought this action against Parkway, the very party that promised to pay her Loan with the BMH
Foundation in exchange for her agreement to end her employment with BMH and work for Parkway.
In spite of Campbell's privity of contract with Parkway, it argues that the cause of action actually
belongs to the BMH Foundation and not to Campbell. Although the BMH Foundation may have
been able to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary, Campbell still has standing to enforce
the agreement made for her benefit. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305 makes it
clear Campbell, as the promisee, has a right to enforce the agreement: "(l) A promise in contract
creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to perform the promise even though he also has a
similar duty to an intended beneficiary." Further,§ 307 directly indicates that "either the promisee
or the beneficiary may maintain a suit for specific performance of a duty owed to an intended
beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 307.
Instead of citing the straightforward cases that make it clear a party to a contract can sue to
enforce its own agreement, Parkway cites to State v. Doe, a case in which a minor sought standing
to contest the constitutionality of a statute on the grounds that it infringed upon his parents' rights.
148 Idaho 919, 936, 231 P .3d 1016, 103 3 (2010). State v. Doe has no applicability to Campbell's
situation. Parkway also cites to Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738-39, 274 P.3d 1249,
1254 (2012), in which a former employee sought reinstatement for himself, and for three other
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employees who were not parties to the action. See id This Court rejected that standing existed for
the three employees not a party to the action. See id. Parkway compares this case to Campbell,
attempting to claim that she is in the same position as one of the three other employees. Again,
Parkway ignores that Campbell is a party to the contract, making these other cases completely
inapplicable. Parkway's promise to pay Campbell's Loan in order to obtain her as its employee was
a promise made to and for the benefit of Campbell. Campbell's lawsuit to force Parkway to do
exactly as it promised is not "judicial vigilantism" as asserted by Parkway (Appellant's Brief, p. 17),
but Campbell's longstanding effort to force Parkway to honor its promise.

As a party to the

agreement, Campbell has standing to compel Parkway to perform its obligation under the agreement.

B.

PARKWAY'S ARGUMENT THAT IT TOOK CARE OF THE LOAN BY DOING
NOTHING WAS REJECTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, AND THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

In this appeal, Parkway again argues that there was never any agreement that Parkway would
actually pay off Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation, but that it could deal with the debt
however it wanted, including "paying the amount immediately, paying the obligation in installment
payments, negotiating a compromise settlement of the obligation, off-setting the amount against
another debt, or simply waiting to see if BMH elected to pursue an action under its contract."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Not only did Parkway present no evidence that this was the case,
Parkway's assertion is yet another example of Parkway's shifting attempts to avoid its obligation to
Campbell. Parkway's first position is this case was that the agreement with Campbell was that
Parkway stepped into the shoes of BMH, meaning that Campbell had to work for Parkway for a
specific amount oftime in order for Parkway to repay Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation. (R.,
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p. 30). When Parkway realized it had no evidence to support that position, Parkway then switched
its stance. Having been unsuccessful with that argument, on appeal to the District Court, Parkway
argued, as it does now, that it could "take care of' the debt however it wanted. (R., p. 142 and
Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Parkway's shifting position with regard to the terms of the agreement
further bolster the Magistrate Court's finding of fact, supported by substantial, competent evidence
in the record, that, consistent with Campbell's position throughout this case, the agreement between
Campbell and Parkway was that if Campbell came to work for Parkway, Parkway would pay off the
debt incurred by Campbell by leaving BMH. Moreover, Parkway's argument ignores the applicable
standard of review, asking this Court to overturn the Magistrate Court's determination, based upon
the evidence presented at trial, that Parkway agreed to repay Campbell's loan to the BMH
Foundation in exchange for Campbell coming to work for Parkway. (R., p. 87-88). This Court does
not review the decision of the Magistrate Court, but the decision by the District Court. See Bailey

v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012).
Parkway completely sidesteps this standard, and instead invites this Court to second guess
the Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, raising evidence it claims is contrary
to the Magistrate Court's determination. Of course, in doing so, Parkway, ignores the substantial,
competent evidence presented by Campbell at trial, which contradicts Parkway's theory of the case.
Campbell presented testimony upon which the Magistrate Court based its decision, indicating that
Parkway understood and agreed that "taking care of' the loan meant paying the loan off for
Campbell. Hirschi, who was Director of Nursing, an officer position, at the time Parkway entered
into the agreement with Campbell, testified:
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(Ms. Ulrich)

Q.

(Hirschi)

A.
Q.
A.

So was the decision made at that meeting to hire Ms.
Campbell?
Yes, it was.
And to pay off her loan for her?
(Nonverbal answer.)
Can you verbalize that?
Yes.

(Mr. Manwaring) Q.
(Hirschi)
A.
Q.
A.

And how was it stated in her interview?
That Parkway would take care of her obligation.
Okay. When you say "take care of it," does that mean - Parkway would pay.

Q.

A.

***

(Tr., p. 124, L. 5-11; p. 138, L. 17-22). Likewise, McCracken, Administrator/CFO for Parkway at
the time, testified:

(Mr. Sorensen)

Q.

(McCracken)

A.

Q.

A.

Okay. And as far as you knew, the board hadn't
authorized you to say "We're going to give you $6,800 if
you come work for us?"
No. That wasn't the authorization at all. It was
authorization to extend employment under the agreement
that they would take care of her obligation.
Okay. By taking care of the obligation, do you mean that
if the obligation-if there did exist an obligation, it would
be paid by Parkway?
Yes.

(Tr., p. 181, L. 25 - p. 182, L. 9). The letters that Hirschi and McCracken wrote on behalf of
Campbell when Parkway refused to pay off Campbell's debt after BMH contacted Campbell about
the nonpayment of the debt also demonstrates that Parkway agreed to actually pay off Campbell's
debt. (Tr., p. 138, L. 19, Ex. D; p. 171, L. 11, Ex. F). Campbell's testimony likewise indicates that
the agreement was that Parkway actually pay Campbell's debt which was incurred as a result of her
leaving BMH to work for Parkway. (Tr., p. 27, L. 3 - p. 28, L. 19). The testimony from Parkway's
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own agents constitutes more than substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the
Magistrate Court's decision and the District Court's decision affirming the Magistrate Court.
Unbelievably, Parkway cites to testimony from its board meetings, demonstrating Parkway
was already considering how it could avoid making the payment it authorized and agreed to pay on
Campbell's behalf, and additionally cites incomplete portions of McCracken and Hirschi' s testimony
regarding Parkway's agreement to pay off Campbell's Loan. Parkway argues it could have done
whatever it wanted regarding Campbell's debt, including paying in installment payments, negotiating
a settlement, off-setting the amount against another debt or waiting for Campbell to be sued, among
other things. (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). The testimony and argument propounded by Parkway
certainly supports a possible fraudulent intent on the part of Parkway, but has no relevance to the
breach of contract claim. As the District Court noted, Parkway presented no testimony as to any
actions it actually took to "take care of' the debt as promised. (R., p. 242).
Parkway's unsupported assertions that it "took care of' the debt do not comport with
Parkway's actions leading up to and during this litigation. Parkway failed to pay the Loan when
Campbell delivered the promissory note and wrote a thank you note thanking Parkway for paying
off the loan. (Tr., p. 38). After receiving the thank you note from Campbell thanking Parkway for
paying off the Loan, Parkway did not approach Campbell to ask why she thought they were actually
paying off the debt or to tell her she was somehow mistaken. (Tr., p. 30, L. 7-21). After the BMH
Foundation had contacted her regarding her unpaid debt, Campbell and Hirschi approached Dr.
Steven Klippert ("Klippert") to inquire as to whether Parkway had actually paid the debt. Klippert
said he would look into the matter. (Tr., p. 3 7, L. 17-24). He did not question why Campbell would
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think the debt had or should have been paid previously. (Tr., p. 38, L. 3-9). When Parkway sought
to entice Campbell to stay at Parkway to become the Director ofNursing, Dr. Bret Rogers stated that
"maybe we'll pay [your Loan] this time if you accept employment." (Tr., p. 38, L. 17 - p. 39, L. 4;
p. 41, L. 16 - p. 43, L. 7). Rogers' comment acknowledges the fact that Parkway should have
previously paid off the debt, as agreed, but did not. Further, Parkway refused to pay the debt as
agreed when Campbell's attorney wrote a demand letter, requesting that the debt be paid after the
BMH Foundation made demand upon Campbell for payment. (Aug. R., Aff. ofDeAnne Casperson,
Ex. B). In response to the letter from Campbell's counsel, Parkway did not assert it could have paid
off or taken care of the debt in any number of ways, as now suggested by Parkway. Rather, Parkway
claimed at the time that it did have an agreement with Campbell, but that the agreement required
Campbell to work for Parkway for three years, (Tr., p. 265, L. 15 - p. 266, L. 9, Ex. H), a position
which Parkway ultimately abandoned, and regarding which Parkway presented no supporting
evidence. Dr. Robert Lee ("Lee"), who authored the response to Campbell's demand, however, did
provide a significant amount of testimony which contradicted the contents of the letter as well as
Parkway's discovery responses which he personally verified. (Tr., p. 266, L. 10 - p. 274, L. 17).
Neither after Campbell provided Parkway with the promissory note and thank you letter, nor after
Campbell informed Parkway that BMH was seeking repayment of the debt from her, did Parkway
assert that it was not obligated to pay off the debt but could take care of the obligation "in a variety
of ways." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Parkway's argument that it somehow complied with the terms
of the agreement by not paying Campbell's debt is unsupported by the evidence, and should be
disregarded. Moreover, Parkway's argument would require that this Court second-guess the
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Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, something it cannot do when the District
Court has affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision and the Magistrate Court's decision is supported
by substantial and competent evidence. The Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law holding that Parkway was required to pay off Campbell's debt to BMH as part of the agreement
between Campbell and Parkway, affirmed by the District Court, should be upheld.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S DECISION ON CAMPBELL'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
REQUIRING PARKWAY TO PAY THE LOAN AS IT PROMISED
Parkway claims the District Court erred by affirming the Magistrate Court's decision on the

breach of contract claim and remanding the case to reform the judgment to require Parkway to pay
the Loan directly to the BMH Foundation. The Magistrate Court required that the money to pay off
the Loan to be paid to Campbell so that she could "tender the amount to 'Foundation' to extinguish
her obligation with them and to thus rehabilitate her reputation in the local medical community."

(R., p. 89). Based on this language used by the Magistrate Court, and Campbell's request for specific
performance, the District Court affirmed the decision on the breach of contract as follows:
Thus Campbell sued for a decree directing Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to the
Foundation. In other words, Campbell sued Parkway for specific performance of its
oral agreement to take care of Campbell's debt to the Foundation. Judge Brower
awarded Campbell monetary damages in the amount of Campbell's debt, together
with any accrued interest, with the assumption that Campbell would tender that
amount to the Foundation.

***

Accordingly, Campbell is not entitled to a direct money judgment against Parkway,
but she is entitled to a decree of specific performance ofher agreement with Parkway.
Judge Brower erred in awarding the amount of the debt to Campbell. On remand, the
Amended Judgment shall be reformed to decree that Campbell is entitled to specific
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performance of Parkway's promise to pay the Foundation for the amount of
Campbell's debt, together with interest.
(R., p. 237). As explained by this Court, "'[t]he remedy of specific performance may be invoked
where necessary to complete justice between the parties. The object of specific performance is to
best effectuate the purpose for which the contract is made, and specific performance should be
granted upon such terms and conditions as justice requires.' 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 2
(2011 ). In considering whether to award specific performance, a court must balance the equities
between the parties." Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 597-98, 249 P.3d 390, 396-97 (2011) (citing
Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 823, 136 P.3d 291, 294 (2006)).
Campbell pied in her breach of contract claim a request for damages, or in the alternative,
a request for Parkway to actual pay the Loan to the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 57-58, 61). Whether
the funds are paid to Campbell so that she can pay the BMH Foundation or Parkway pays them
directly to the BMH Foundation makes little difference to Campbell. Throughout the litigation, and
at trial, Campbell has made it clear that she wanted Parkway to fulfill its promise. (Campbell Depo.
Tr., p. 43, L. 6-21; p. 12, L. 18 - p. 13, L. 7; p. 48, L. 25 -p. 49, L.19; p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 7).
Parkway induced Campbell to leave her employment with BMH, creating the debt to the Foundation,
with Parkway's promise to pay the debt and she is entitled to have it paid. The Magistrate Court
clearly intended by its ruling that Parkway be required to pay off Campbell's debt, albeit through
Campbell, with the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 102). Instead of funneling the debt payment through
Campbell to the BMH Foundation, the District Court found that Campbell's requested remedy,
asking that Parkway be ordered to pay off the Loan, i.e., specific performance, was the appropriate
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remedy under the circumstances and what appeared to be intended by the Magistrate Court. As set
forth below, Parkway has failed to demonstrate that the District Court's decision was in error.

1.

Campbell Requested the Remedy of Specific Performance of Parkway's Promise
to Pay Campbell's Loan.

Parkway's argument that the remedy of specific performance was a surprise and raised for
the first time by the District Court (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) is contradicted repeatedly by the record.
On numerous occasions, Campbell put Parkway on notice that she was requesting an order from
the Court that Parkway pay the debt as promised the promise Parkway made to induce Campbell
to leave her employment with BMH. In fact, in the demand letter Campbell initially sent to Parkway,
she requested exactly what she has always wanted- that Parkway pay the Foundation as it agreed
it would do if Campbell ended her employment with BMH and came to work for Parkway. (Aug.
R., Aff. of DeAnne Casperson, Ex. B). Campbell performed her end of the agreement, while
Parkway, initially unbeknownst to Campbell, failed to pay the Loan. It was not until Campbell
received a telephone call in 2005 and an invoice from the BMH Foundation, requesting payment,
that she learned Parkway failed to perform its end of the agreement. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 46, L.
6 - p. 47, L. 4). After Parkway refused to pay the Foundation as agreed, Campbell initiated legal
action against Parkway.
Although Campbell did not use the words "specific performance" in the Second Amended
Complaint, she put Parkway on notice that she was requesting specific performance. "The Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a system of notice pleading intended to free litigants from what
were once rigid pleading requirements." Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 752, 274
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P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012). As set forth in Carillo, this Court has explained the purpose of notice
pleading:
The general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every
litigant with his or her day in court. The rules are to be construed to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. The purpose
of a complaint is to inform the defendant of the material facts upon which the
plaintiff bases his action. A complaint need only contain a concise statement of the
facts constituting the case of action and a demand for relief.

Id (quoting Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986)). "A party's pleadings
should be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case."

Mickelsen Const. Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 406, 299 P.3d 203, 213 (2013) (quoting
Youngbloodv. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665,668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008)). "Under notice pleading,
a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. . . . The general
policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant his or her day in court."

Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010).
In her Second Amended Complaint, Campbell asserted a breach of contract/declaratory
judgment claim, and requested remedies as follows:
•

Plaintiff has incurred damages and will continue to incur damages, and/or is
entitled to a declaratory judgment directing Defendant to repay her Forgivable
Loan Agreement with Bingham Memorial." (R., p. 58).

•

For a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant to pay to Bingham Memorial
the principal amount of $6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon
judgment, or, in the alternative, for a money judgment in the principal amount
of$6,800.00 plus an award of interest in an amount to be determined upon
judgment. (R., p. 61 ).

•

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premises. (R., p. 61 ).
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The Second Amended Complaint actually provides more detail, specifically requesting the actual
performance requested based on the promise given. The fact that Campbell described the actual
performance she was requesting based on the agreement instead of using the words "specific
performance" provides Parkway more notice, not less. Further, under the liberal pleading rules,
Campbell is not required to use any magic words to assert a claim or request a remedy. However,
Campbell provided more detail than the pleading standard, actually setting forth the actual act of
specific performance requested.
Further, Parkway's argument that Campbell failed to make her request for specific
performance an issue during the litigation and at trial is belied by the record. During the course of
the litigation, Parkway deposed Campbell. Parkway's counsel specifically inquired about Campbell's
claim for relief from the Second Amended Complaint:
BY MR. SORENSEN:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

I am looking at your second amended complaint. It's on file with the court.
And it says you want the defendant, which is Parkway, to pay
Bingham Memorial $6,800 plus interest to be determined on the judgement;
or in the alternative for a money judgement and principal amount of $6,800
plus an award of interest in the amount to be determined upon judgement.
So are you saying that if you don't have to pay Parkway or pay
Bingham Memorial Hospital any money back, do you still want my clients to
pay you $6,800?
I want them to pay Bingham $6,800.
So, you're not asking for money for yourself, only for Bingham?
Correct.

(Campbell Depo. Tr., p. 43, L. 6-21). At the onset of trial, Campbell's counsel in her opening
statement, again made the request for actual performance of the agreement as follows:
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(Ms. Ulrich) And, Your Honor, that is why we have brought this case for Ms.
Campbell, is that she just wants to have that loan paid off. She loved working at
Bingham Memorial. It was a good place. They were good people there. She has local
ties. And she doesn't want her reputation ruined because Parkway didn't fulfill its part
of a promise.
She's an honest person. She wants to keep that reputation. And she wants
Bingham Memorial to have that loan paid back to them too because it's the
right thing to do and that is what Parkway agreed to.
And so that's why today we are just asking you to enforce this agreement and
require Parkway to do what it promised to do in return for Ms. Campbell
coming to work for them.
(Tr., p. 12, L. 18 - p. 13, L. 7) (bold emphasis added). In response, Parkway's counsel made no
objection. In its opening statement, Parkway primarily argued that there was no "meeting of the
minds" and therefore, no contract. (Tr., p. 13, L. 11 - p. 14, L. 17). Campbell confirmed at trial that
the BMH Foundation contacted her to obtain payment and sent her an invoice, showing what she
owed. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 46, L. 6-p. 47, L.4, Pl. Ex. 8)2 • In addition, Campbell fully admitted
that she had not paid the debt, and expected Parkway to directly pay it as promised. (Tr., p. 36, L.
21-25; p. 48, L.14-p. 49, L. 19; p. 60, L. 25 -p. 61, L. 2). Parkway's counsel demonstrated his clear

Parkway repeatedly asserts, for the first time on this second appeal, that Campbell never
presented evidence of an obligation between herself and the BMH Foundation. First, Parkway has
waived this argument, and it should not be considered by this Court. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139
Idaho 430,436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) (citingMcPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d
317, 323 (2003)). However, assuming arguendo, that this issue is properly before the Court,
Campbell presented evidence of both the agreement and her continuing obligation to BMH at trial
via the Bingham Memorial Hospital Foundation Forgivable Loan Promissory Note and the Bingham
Memorial Hospital Forgivable Loan Agreement (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 - p. 21, L. 16; PL Ex. A), the
balance statement from BMH sent to Campbell when BMH sought to collect the loan debt in 2005
(Tr., p. 45, L. 1 - p. 46, L. 5; PL Ex. B) and Campbell's own testimony. (Tr., p. 46, L. 6-24). The
Magistrate Court found that Campbell owed a debt to BMH. (R., p. 85, ,i 4; p. 86, ,r 7; p. 86, ,r 9).
The District Court acknowledged the Magistrate Court's finding that Campbell owed a debt to the
BMH Foundation. (R., p. 221, p. 222). There is no question that Campbell presented substantial and
competent evidence of her obligation to the BMH Foundation.
2
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understanding as to what Campbell was seeking as a remedy from the breach of contract claim in
his cross examination at trial:
(Mr. Sorensen)

Q.

(Campbell)

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

What you really wanted this to be was a
signing bonus, didn't you?
No, sir.
You wanted to be repaid $6,800 even if you walked out of
the door and resigned from Parkway -- or resigned from
the hospital and worked one minute for the Parkway
Surgery Center, you thought that obligated them to pay
the money to you; is that right?
I don't want them to pay the money to me.
Okay.
The money needs So you never wanted the money. But to the hospital, is
that right?
That's correct.
Did you think that -- my understanding is that you thought
that, as part of the deal to leave Bingham Memorial
Hospital, that, in your mind, Parkway was going to repay
this obligation?
Correct.

(Tr., p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 7). Parkway demonstrated a full understanding that Campbell was
requesting that Parkway pay the Loan directly to the BMH Foundation. Parkway's argument that
Campbell failed to plead or present evidence of her request for specific performance is without merit
and should be disregarded.

2.

The District Court Correctly Found Evidence to Support Specific Performance
as the Appropriate Remedy Presented at Trial and on Appeal.

In order to avoid any damages as a result of its breach of contract, Parkway argues that
Campbell cannot receive monetary damages without having paid the Loan first, and that Campbell
is not entitled to specific performance, giving Parkway a windfall of never having to perform its
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promise in spite of its breach. Parkway ignores the well-established law that an appellate court may
affirm the trial court's decision if an alternative legal basis supports it. See Hanf v. Syringa Realty,

Inc., 120 Idaho 364,370, 816 P.2d 320,326 (1991). "It is well established that this Court will use
the correct legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a district court even when it is based on an
erroneous legal theory." J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,853,820
P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991). Citing to In re Estate ofBoyd, 134 Idaho 669,675 P.3d 664,670 (Ct. App.
2000), the District Court recognized and applied its authority to affirm the decision but to remand
to reform the judgment according to the correct legal authority. (R., p. 237). In fact, the District
Court recognized that the Magistrate Court intended the BMH Foundation to receive the money from
Parkway: "In her Second Amended Complaint, Campbell requested specific performance of
Parkway's promise and Judge Brower indicated his intent that the award to Campbell would be paid
to the Foundation. Accordingly, Judge Brower's Amended Judgment shall be remanded for
reformation as instructed above." (R., p. 239).
The District Court also correctly identified Campbell's right to pursue a claim for the breach
as the promisee as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 305, comment a:

a. The promisee 's right. The promisee of a promise for the benefit of a beneficiary
has the same right to performance as any other promisee, whether the promise is
binding because part of a bargain, because of his reliance, or because of its formal
characteristics. If the promisee has no economic interest in the performance, as in
many cases involving gift promises, the ordinary remedy of damages for breach of
contract is an inadequate remedy, since only nominal damages can be recovered. In
such cases specific performance is commonly appropriate. See§ 307. In the ordinary
case of a promise to pay the promisee's debt, on the other hand, the promisee may
suffer substantial damages as a result of breach by the promisor. So long as there is
no conflict with rights of the beneficiary or the promisor, he is entitled to recover
such damages. See § 310.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 305, cmt. a. Because Campbell has an economic interest
in the payment of her own debt, she could seek either specific performance or contract damages.
Although Campbell asserts the remedy could have been fashioned under direct damages to her or
as specific performance, the District Court's decision to remand the case to reform the judgment so
the money damages are directly paid to the BMH Foundation is exactly what Campbell has
consistently sought. Further, Campbell has no objection to the money damages being paid directly
to the BMH Foundation because it resolves any potential claim by the Foundation as a beneficiary,
which resolves any future claims.
Parkway fails to explain how specific performance is inappropriate under the circumstances.
This Court has set forth the basic requirements of specific performance as follows:
The general rules of the common law are that: (1) a party is entitled to the equitable
remedy of specific performance when damages, the legal remedy, are inadequate; (2)
because of the perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are
inadequate in an action for breach of a land sale contract, and the non-breaching party
need not make a separate showing of the inadequacy of damages; (3) the remedy is
equally available to both vendors and purchasers; and (4) additionally, the
appropriateness of specific performance as relief in a particular case lies within the
discretion of the trial court.

Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578,582, 701 P.2d 198,202 (1985). Although the District Court did not
cite this general statement regarding specific performance, it clearly recognized the authority from
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 307, "Remedy of Specific Performance" when there
has been a promise to pay a debt to a third party. (R., p. 236). The District Court's analysis of the
need for specific performance takes into account the position of both parties based on the findings
of fact from the Magistrate Court. The Magistrate Court found that Parkway breached its agreement
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with Campbell by its failure to pay the Loan. (R., p. 87-88). The Magistrate Court also found that
Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation "remains unpaid and unsatisfied," and that "Parkway has
refused to pay this debt on behalf of Ms. Campbell." (R., p. 86). Further, the Magistrate Court
intended that Campbell tender the damages to the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 89). Based on the
substantial and competent evidence, the District Court correctly found that specific performance was
the more appropriate legal remedy under the circumstances, and the remedy that appeared to be
intended by the Magistrate Court. In addition, there is no dispute that if Campbell is not entitled to
money damages, the legal remedy of nominal damages is inadequate. The remedy of specific
performance also protects Parkway's interests by resolving claims from Campbell and the BMH
Foundation as against Parkway. Further, specific performance in this case, particularly where it is
merely a money judgment paid to a third party instead of the promisee, "best effectuates the purpose
for which the contract was made." See Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 597-98, 249 P.3d 390, 39697 (2011). Further, Parkway presents no argument that specific performance would be "unjust,
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id Consequently, the District Court's decision should be affirmed.

3.

Parkway Waived Any Argument Related to the Declaratory Judgment Act and
the Request for Specific Performance Because it Raised No Objection.

On February 24, 2009, Campbell filed a motion to amend, attaching the proposed Second
Amended Complaint to the motion. (Aug. R., Motion to Amend Complaint, Ex. A). In the Second
Amended Complaint, Campbell amended her previously stated breach of contract claim to assert a
causeofactionfor"BREACHOFCONTRACT/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT." (R.,p. 57-58).
In paragraph 20 ofthat cause of action, Campbell asserted the following: "As a result of Defendant's
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breach, Plaintiff has incurred damages and will continue to incur damages, and/or is entitled to a
declaratory judgment directing Defendant to repay her Forgivable Loan Agreement with Bingham
Memorial." (R., p. 58). In addition, Campbell modified her prayer for relief to specifically ask for
"a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant to pay to Bingham Memorial the principal amount of
$6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon judgment..." and for "such other and further relief as
the Court deems just and equitable in the premises." (R., p. 61 ). Campbell did not cite the provisions
of the Declaratory Judgment Act anywhere in the Second Amended Complaint. (R., p. 54-64).
In response to the motion, Parkway submitted an objection, but never raised any objection

to this cause of action. (Aug. R., Response to Mot. to Amend Complaint). In fact, the first time
Parkway has ever raised any objection to Campbell's breach of contract/declaratory judgment cause
of action is in this appeal.

Parkway never asserted that Campbell's claim for breach of

contract/declaratory judgment action was not allowable before the Magistrate Court or the District
Court. Parkway can hardly claim error based on Campbell's breach of contract/declaratory judgment
cause of action, asking for Parkway to be required to actually perform its agreement, when it never
objected, sought a motion to dismiss, or took any other action.

Further, Parkway filed a

counterclaim, cross-claim, and requested a jury trial - all of which demonstrate it did not view the
action as solely a declaratory judgment proceeding. (R., p. 65-72). Parkway also tried the case,
knowing the remedy Campbell wanted was for Parkway to pay the debt to the BMH Foundation (Tr.,
p. 63, L. 14-p. 64, L. 2). From the Second Amended Complaint, it is obvious Campbell's use of the
term "declaratory judgment" was intended to illustrate the unique nature of Campbell's status in
bringing a breach of contract claim to force Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to another party or for
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her to obtain contract damages so she could pay the debt off herself. Although it would have been
more accurate for Campbell to title the claim "breach of contract/decree of specific performance,"
the intent from the alternate remedies requested was sufficient to put Parkway on notice of the
remedy Campbell was requesting.
Further, Parkway's argument that a claim for damages or specific performance could not be
included with a declaratory judgment action is incorrect. As the District Court for the Fourth
Judicial District noted, "[t]he issue in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 125
P .3d 1067 (2005) was the ability of a party to amend a complaint for declaratory relief to add a claim
for damages when there was already a pending claim in another court on the same subject, it is not
authority for the proposition that an action for damages may never be combined with a declaratory
judgment action." Curtis-Klure, PLLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., Dkt. No. CV OC 0716381,
2008 WL 8832970, n.l (Idaho Dist. Feb. 22, 2008). In fact, Idaho Code § 10-1209 specifically
allows determinations of issues of fact as necessary.
Because Parkway raised no objection to Campbell's cause of action for "breach of
contract/declaratory judgment," and was on notice of the request for specific performance based on
the Second Amended Complaint, which was demonstrated by its own conduct at trial, Parkway's
argument should be dismissed.
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D.

EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NOT RELIED ON SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, A DAMAGE AWARD DIRECTLY TO CAMPBELL WAS
ALLOWABLE AND COULD SERVE AS AN ALTERNATE BASIS OF AFFIRMING
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION

Even if specific performance is not available to Campbell, the remedy of damages directly
to Campbell is allowable for Campbell to pay off her debt to the BMH Foundation and compensates
her for Parkway's breach. 3 "This Court may uphold decisions on alternate grounds from those stated
in the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on appeal." Martel v. Balotti, 138 Idaho 451,453, 65
P.3d 192, 194 (2003). Parkway asserts Campbell should have appealed the Magistrate Court's
decision, but ignores that Campbell sought alternative remedies - either requiring Parkway to pay
the BMH Foundation directly, or providing her the funds so that she could pay the debt. The
Magistrate Court's decision and the District Court's decision accomplished that request. As an
alternative to specific performance, however, Campbell asserts that damages to her for the purpose
of paying off her debt is an alternative legal theory to affirm the decision of the District Court.
Campbell is entitled to protect her economic interests in Parkway's promise to pay her debt.
The law in Idaho is quite clear on the issue of contract damages:
A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages sustained as a breach of the contract. The
damages for a breach of contract are compensatory damages or damages that will
fully compensate the non-breaching party for the loss suffered as a result of the
breach of contract. The compensatory damages are measured by the amount that
would be necessary to put the plaintiff in as good a position as would full
performance of the contract. Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184
(Ct.App.1993); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082 (1991).

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 15, a respondent may raise an additional issue on appeal
that does not seek affirmative relief. Campbell asserts this issue is an alternate method of affirming
the District Court's decision.
3
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Jenicek v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., CV-01-05652, 2003 WL 23914536 (Idaho Dist. Aug. 11,
2003) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1981). There is
no doubt that if Parkway had actually performed its part of the contract as promised, it would have
paid the debt owed by Campbell to the BMH Foundation, and the debt would subsequently cease to
exist. Campbell produced as evidence the invoice she received from the BMH Foundation and
testimony regarding telephone calls from the BMH Foundation regarding payment of the debt and
the amount. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 44, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 24; PL Ex. B). On December 29, 2005, the
BMH Foundation's invoice to Campbell indicated she owed $8,005.96 with interest continuing to
accrue. (PL Ex. B). Incurring debt as a result of a breach of contract is damage and entitles Campbell
to receive damages because she has an economic interest in the performance promised by Parkway.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 305, 307. Section 305 provides the following
example:
Illustrations: 4. A owes C $100. For consideration B promises A to pay the debt to
C. On B's breach A may obtain a judgment for $ 100 against B. But the court may
protect B against double payment by permittingjoinder of C, by an order that money
collected by A is to be applied to reduce A's debt to C, by giving B credit on the
judgment for payments to C which reduce A's obligation, or by enjoining
enforcement of the judgment to the extent of such payment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 305, cmt. b, Ills. 4. The Magistrate Court primarily
followed this example by giving a money judgment to Campbell to be paid to the BMH Foundation:
"The above-stated money judgment shall be paid directly to Ms. Campbell so that she may tender
such amount to Bingham Memorial Hospital Foundation to extinguish her obligation.... " (R., p.
102.) Further, the substantial case law addressing the unique circumstance of an agreement to pay
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the debt of another illustrates Campbell can recover damage in the amount of the debt. Although
this narrow issue could not be found in any Idaho case, the well established holding in other states
is that where a party has agreed to pay the debt of another to obtain economic benefit, the debt does
not have to be paid by the non-breaching party in order to establish damages and the amount of
damages are measured by the amount of the debt that was to be paid. Much of the case law
regarding this issue is approximately 100 years old. Many of the cases acknowledge the consensus
that the debt does not have to be repaid to pursue the breach. In a more recent case addressing this
topic oflaw, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled on an agreement to pay the debt of another. See Mead

v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S. W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981 ). In Mead, the parties agreed in association with
the sale of the business that Johnson Group would pay certain debts of the business. Id at 686. When
Johnson Group failed to pay the debts, Mead filed suit for the breach, claiming damages for the
unpaid debts. A jury awarded Mead damages for the unpaid debts. The trial court reversed, holding
Mead could not recover on the unpaid debt without paying the debt first. In reversing the trial court,
the Texas Supreme Court held as follows:

In a suit similar to the instant case involving the sale of business and assumption of
existing debts, it was held the contract created a direct obligation from the promisor
to the promisee and did not require that the promisee first pay the debts in order to
recover. Cohen v. Simpson, 32 S.W. 59, 61 (Tex.Civ.App. 1895, writ dism'd). See
also Smith v. Smith, 595 S.W.2d 631,632 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
There are other cases in which Texas courts have permitted recovery for expenses
incurred without first requiring payment by the plaintiff. See, e. g., Triton Oil & Gas
Corp. v. E. W Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678,686 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth
1974, writ refd n. r. e.) (materials and services in drilling contract); Taylor v. Mark,
376 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1964, writ refd n. r. e.) (materials in a
construction contract); San Antonio &A. P. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 31 Tex.Civ.App. 371,
72 S.W. 226,228 (1903, writrefd) (medical expenses). This court noted in Smith v.
Nesbitt, supra, 230 S. W. at 978, that proper orders directing the promisee to apply the
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recovery to payment of the debt would prevent double recovery. Here, the trial court
so ordered. Johnson received valuable assets from Mead from which he has
profited. He breached the contract, yet is relieved of the obligation to perform
that which he agreed to do pay the SBA loan and business debts. To permit this
result is inequitable and allows Johnson to be unjustly enriched. We hold that
Mead is not required first to pay the loan and debts assumed under the
contract.

Id. at 689 (emphasis added). The holding in Mead is reflected in numerous other cases from many
other jurisdictions all addressing the failure to pay another's debt pursuant to contract. See Fairfield

v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 A. 263 (1901) (measure of damages is full amount of accrued liability);
Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500,507 (1876) (repayment is not required in order to pursue breach
of contract claim); Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350,352 (1928) (measure of damages is amount of

debt);Lathropv. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117, 123-24 (1851) (no obligation to repay debt when breaching
party obtained direct benefit); Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 102 (1881) (same); Merriam v. Pine

City Lumber Co., 23 Minn. 314 (1877) (same); Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 655-56, 62 P. 216
(1900) (same); Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895 (1915) (same); Stout v. Folger, 34
Iowa 71, 75-76, 1872 WL 182 (1871) (same); Turner v. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167, 170-71, 151 P.
751 (1915) (same); and Wrightv. Chapin, 87 Hun. 144, 33 N.Y.S. 1068, 1070-71(N.Y. Gen. Term,
1895) (same). For the Court's convenience, the relevant holdings from these cases are set forth in
Addendum A. Just like Mead, Campbell is entitled to either specific performance or damages for the
debt Parkway agreed to pay and did not so she can extinguish her debt.
In addition, Idaho court's have allowed the recovery of damages without requiring payment

by the plaintiff first. In Warm Springs Development Assoc. Limited Partnership v. Burrows, 120
Idaho 280,285,815 P.2d 478,483 (Ct. App. 1991), a landlord brought a breach of contract claim
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for physical damages done to the premises. The tenant argued that the landlord could not recover
for damages to the leased property because the landlord had not actually performed any of the
repairs, but only provided testimony and estimates of the amounts necessary to make the repairs as
a result of the damage allegedly done by the tenant. See id The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, holding that the evidence proved the damages with reasonable certainty as follows:
When a tenant covenants to keep the premises in good repair, the landlord is not
obligated to repair the property at the expiration of the lease, and nothing in this lease
prevents Warm Springs from making an agreement with the next lessee to repair the
property or accept the premises in the condition they are in. To recover damages
under count two of the complaint, Warm Springs had only to show that the damages
were proved with reasonable certainty. This requirement was met through the
testimony of King.

See id Just like Warm Springs, Campbell established the amount of the damage to her as a result
of the existing debt and interest that had accrued by her testimony and the invoice from the BMH
Foundation. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 44, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 24, Pl. Ex. B). Parkway did not present any
evidence that the calculations of the debt were incorrect, or that the debt did not exist. Campbell
proved the amount of damage with reasonable certainty.
Campbell's expectation in entering into the contract with Parkway, and performing her part
by leaving her employment with BMH, thereby incurring a debt, was that Parkway would pay her
debt to the BMH Foundation as promised. Whether this is accomplished by damages to Campbell
so she can pay off the debt or by way of specific performance, Campbell is entitled to the benefit of
her bargain. Pursuant to Idaho case law regarding contract damages, and the law in other
jurisdictions pertaining to contracts in which a party agrees to pay the debt of another and then
breaches, the damages suffered by the non-breaching party are measured by the amount of the debt
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which the breaching party did not pay. Because the contract is not one of indemnity, there is no
obligation for the non-breaching party to pay the debt first.

Consequently, even if specific

performance is inapplicable, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed.

E.

CAMPBELL'S AGREEMENT WITH PARKWAY IS NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Parkway argues yet again on appeal that Campbell's agreement with Parkway was barred by

the statute of frauds. However, the agreement between Campbell and Parkway falls within an
exception to the statute of frauds and is therefore not barred. With regard to Parkway's statute of
frauds argument, Parkway acknowledges the exception to the statute of frauds found in Idaho Code
§ 9-506(3) which provides that oral agreements to answer for the debt of another are enforceable

where the promising party gains some direct benefit for itself by making such promise. See LC.§ 9506(3). However, Parkway argues that Idaho Code§ 9-506(3) does not apply.
Idaho Code § 9-506 provides as follows:
A promise to answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is
deemed an original obligation of the promisor, and need not be in writing:

[... ]
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon
the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation,
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the
party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person.
LC. § 9-506(3). The language of§ 9-506(3) in particular which is pertinent to the situation at hand
is "[w]here the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made ... upon a
36

consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the antecedent
obligation, or from another person." LC. § 9-506(3). Although Parkway attempts to skirt case law
on this issue to create its own interpretation of the meaning ofldaho Code§ 9-506(3), there is ample
Idaho case law, as well as case law from other jurisdictions, explaining the meaning ofthis particular
exception to the statute of frauds. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Johnson Cattle Co., Inc. v.
Idaho First Nat. Bank, 110 Idaho 604, 719 P.2d 1376 (1986), that Idaho Code§ 9-506(3) "allows

for enforcement of an oral promise to answer for the debt of another if the promisor obtains a direct
benefit." Id., 110 Idaho at 607, 719 P.2d at 1379. This rule is generally known as the "leadingobject rule" or the "main-purpose rule," and is defined in BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY as "[t]he
doctrine that if a promise to guarantee another's debt is made primarily for the promisor' s own
benefit, then the statute of frauds does not apply and the promise need not be in writing to be
enforceable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Other jurisdictions have recognized this
rule taking oral promises out of the statute of frauds as well. See, i.e., Trans-Gear v. Lichtenberger,
715 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Hite Crane & Rigging, Inc.,
678 P.2d 346 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); and Haas Drilling Co. v. First Nat. Bank Dallas, 456 S.W.2d
886 (Tex. 1970). This is exactly the situation Campbell found herself in with Parkway. Parkway,
through McCracken, its Administrator/CFO at the time, made an oral promise to Campbell that if
would she would come to work for Parkway, Parkway would pay off her Loan to the BMH
Foundation. (R., p. 86).

McCracken made this promise at the direction of Parkway's board. (R.,

p. 85-86). Parkway obtained a direct benefit from this promise to Campbell, i.e., Campbell quitting
her job at BMH and coming to work for Parkway. Parkway's main purpose in agreeing to pay off
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Campbell's loan with BMH was to obtain for itself the benefit of having Campbell come to work
for Parkway. Parkway's promise to answer for Campbell's debt was primarily for Parkway's benefit,
and therefore, Parkway's oral agreement with Campbell to pay off her debt with the BMH
Foundation falls outside the statute of frauds and is enforceable.
Parkway also argues that Campbell's agreement with Parkway is not enforceable because,
when Campbell negotiated with Parkway for Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to the BMH
Foundation directly, Campbell became a non-party to the Loan between herself and BMH, and,
therefore, has no right to enforce her agreement with Parkway. 4 (See Appellant's Brief, p. 33-34).
In support ofthis argument, Parkway cites to the dissenting opinion in Jones v. Better Homes, Inc.,
79 Idaho 294,300, 316 P.2d 256 (1957), which does not address the particular statute of frauds
exception at issue here. Moreover, Parkway's argument that Campbell has no ability to enforce the
agreement she made with Parkway would belie the existence ofldaho Code§ 9-506(3) in the first
place, rendering it superfluous and meaningless. Parkway's argument appears to imply that the only
party with enforceable rights under the "leading object" rule exception to the statute of frauds is the
original creditor. However, such a position is not legally tenable, given that no direct contractual
relationship need exist with the original creditor in order for the subsequent agreement to answer for
the original debt to be enforceable against the promising party. Parkway has cited to no case law
indicating that, under the§ 9-506(3) statute of frauds exception, Campbell has no right to enforce
her agreement with Parkway.

As set forth in Section VI.A.3, both the beneficiary and the promisee have a right of
enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt. a.
4
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Although there is no Idaho case law directly on point, the Ohio Court of Appeals has
addressed this very issue:
If, however, the trial court determines that the promisor did not become primarily
liable, and the original debtor remains liable, then the promise is nothing more than
a collateral or secondary promise to answer for the debt of another, and the Statute
of Frauds is applicable. Then, at that juncture, the court may inquire "whether the
promisor's leading object was to subserve his own business or pecuniary interest."
Id. at 459, 8.O.O.3d at 449,377 N.E.2d at 518. This is commonly referred to as the
leading-object rule and exception. See Mentor Lumber & Supply Co. v. Victor (Dec.
31, 1990), Lake App. No. 89-L-14-103, unreported, 1990 WL 237185. When the
leading object of the promisor is not to answer for another's debt but to subserve
some pecuniary or business purpose of his own involving a benefit to himself, his
secondary or collateral promise is not within the Statute of Frauds. Wilson Floors.

In the instant case, the record strongly supports the trial court's determination that
Lichtenberger was a secondary and not a primary obligor. Clearly, Booher still
remained obligated to Trans-Gear, despite any guaranty of Lichtenberger. Thus, the
second phase of the Wilson Floors test needed to be employed:
"Under the second test, it is of no consequence that when such
promise is made, the original obligor remains primarily liable or that
the third party continues to look to the original obligor for payment.
So long as the promisor undertakes to pay the subcontractor whatever
his services are worth irrespective of what he may owe the general
contractor, and so long as the main purpose of the promisor is to
further his own business or pecuniary interest, the promise is
enforceable. Thus, under this test it is not required to show as a
condition precedent for enforceability of the oral contract that the
original debt is extinguished." Id at 459-460, 8 O.O.3d at 449, 377
N.E.2d at 519.
Trans-Gear, Inc. v. Lichtenberger, 128 Ohio App.3d 504,510, 715 N.E.2d 608,611 (Ohio Ct. App.

1998). Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-506(3), Campbell is entitled to enforce an oral agreement
between herself and Parkway through which Parkway was obligated to pay off Campbell's debt to
the BMH Foundation directly. Parkway's argument that Campbell has no contractual rights to
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enforce a contract which terms she personally negotiated and from which she has an economic
interest has no basis in law. Because Parkway obtained a direct benefit from the verbal agreement
with Campbell to pay the Loan, the statute of frauds is inapplicable. Consequently, the District
Court's decision on the statute of frauds should be affirmed.

F.

AS THE PREVAILING PARTY, CAMPBELL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL, NOT PARKWAY
1.

Parkway Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.

Parkway argues it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal based upon Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. However, because this Court should affirm the District

Court's decision in favor of Campbell, Parkway cannot be the prevailing party on appeal and is
therefore not entitled to attorney's fees or costs on appeal.

2.

Campbell Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.

As the prevailing party, Campbell is entitled to the costs associated with this action pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) because the amount Campbell pied was
$25,000.00 5 or less, and Campbell sent demand to Parkway for payment of the amount in
controversy more than ten days prior to the filing of the action (Aug. R., Aff. of DeAnne Casperson,
Ex. B). Idaho Code § 12-120(1) also allows for the recovery of attorney's fees on appeal. See
Chavez v. Barras, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008).

Additionally, Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(3)
because Campbell is the prevailing party and the contract at issue is in this matter between Camp bell

5

The amount under Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) has since been amended to $35,000.
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and Parkway constituted a commercial transaction. Actions brought for breach of a contract related
to employment are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney's fee provision
ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3). See Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 842, 41
P.3d 263,270 (2002); Teton Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,492, 20
P.3d 21, 28 (Ct. App. 2001).
Campbell has prevailed in this matter on both her breach of contract claim and successfully
defended Parkway's counterclaim. Even, assuming arguendo, that specific performance is not
allowed and Campbell cannot personally be awarded damages, Campbell is entitled to nominal
damages for the breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt. a. As a result,
Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party in this action.

VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Campbell respectfully requests that the District Court's decision be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 st day December, 2014.

~

A.Q

,_,(;]J,R="' ~.....,~

DeAnne Casperson
-()
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Cfapo, P .L.L.C.
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Respondent

G:IWPDATA\DC\ 12942-001 Campbell (Appeal)\Supreme Court Appeal\Respondent's Brie(REV 1. wpd:dg

41

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the following described pleading or document on the
attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage
thereon, on this 3 pt day of December, 2014.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

DOCUMENT SERVED:
ATTORNEYS SERVED:

( 4 s t Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Via Overnight Mail

Paul J. Stark
Stark Law, P.C.
5088 N. Aberdeen Place
Meridian, Idaho 83646

~~CvJ>

DeAnne Casperson

42

CoAJ\~
&

ADDENDUM A

J.

Fairfield v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 A. 263 (1901) (emphasis added):
The contention of the defendant is that his contract in respect to the payment of the
outstanding bills was one of indemnity merely, while the contention of the plaintiff
is that it was one for the unconditional payment of liabilities. There being a wellsettled distinction between an agreement to indemnify and an agreement to pay, it is
necessary in the first instance to determine the nature of the contract upon which this
action is founded. The contract speaks for itself. By it, and for a valuable
consideration, the defendant, among other things, "was to pay all outstanding bills
due on account of the business," among which were the claims which are now sought
to be recovered. This language is plain and unequivocal. It admits of but one
construction. In common understanding and in legal effect the defendant undertook
and agreed "to pay all outstanding bills due on account of the business" as his own
proper debts, and not merely to indemnify the plaintiff against them. In such a case
a recovery may be had as soon as there is a breach of the contract, and the
measure of the damages is the full amount of the accrued liability; whereas in
contracts of indemnity the obligee cannot recover until he has been actually
damnified, and then only to the extent of the injury sustained by him up to the time
of the institution of his suit.

2.

Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 507 (1876) (emphasis added):

That a promise to pay a debt due from the promisee, even where it has not been
paid by him, is one upon which an action may be maintained and damages
recovered to the amount of such debt, is held by many authorities. Holmes v.
Rhodes, 1 B. & P. 638. Cutler v. Southern, 1 Saund. 116, Wms.' note. Toussaint v.
Martinnant, 2 T. R. 100. Martin v. Court, 2. T. R. 640. Hodgson v. Bell, 7 T. R. 97.
Thomas v. Allen, 1 Hill, 145. Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M. & W. 657. Penny v. Foy,
8 B. & C. 11. In Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 B. & Ad. 772, the defendant, by a settlement
made upon his marriage, conveyed an estate upon certain trusts, and covenanted with
the trustees to pay off incurnbrances on the estate to the amount of£ 19,000, within
a year, and it was held, upon his failure to do so, that the trustees were entitled to
recover the whole £19,000 in an action of covenant, although no payment had been
made by them, and no special damage was laid or proved. Whether the contracts in
some of these cases were anything more than contracts of indemnity, and therefore
whether there could under our decisions have been any recovery, might perhaps be
questioned. Cushingv. Gore, 15 Mass. 69. Little v. Little, ubi supra. That, however,
need not now be considered, as we treat the agreement before us as one not for
indemnity merely, but for payment.
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3.

Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350,288 (1928) (emphasis added)
The contract is not one of indemnity. It is a contract to pay and discharge a debt of
the plaintiff made upon consideration moving from the plaintiff to the defendants.
In cases of such sort, authorities are fairly in accord, or at least it is the
prevailing doctrine, that one in the position of the plaintiff may recover, and
that the amount of the debt is the measure of his damages. Merriam v. Pine City
Lbr. Co., 23 Minn. 314; Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 71, 11 Am. Rep. 138; Lathrop v.
Atwood, 21 Conn. 117; Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341; Locke
v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 41 Am. Rep. 199; Shattuck v. Adams, 136 Mass. 34; Lee v.
Burrell, 51 Mich. 132, 16N.W. 309; Turnerv. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167,151 P. 751;
Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 62 P.216; Gage v. Lewis, 68 Ill. 604; Fairfield v.
Day, 71 N.H. 63; 51 A. 263; Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895; 3
Sutherland, Damages (4th Ed.)§ 765, p. 2892, 2893; 2 Sedgwick, Damages (9 th Ed.)
§ 789, p. 1641; 8 R.C.L. p. 463, § 30; 1 Williston, Contracts, p. 374, § 392, et seq.;
3 Williston Contracts, p. 2500, § 1408. And this is the apparent future of the
doctrine. See Am. L. Inst. Restatement Contracts (Tent.)§ 133(b).

4.

Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117, 123-24 (1851) (emphasis added):
These debts were all then due to the respective creditors of Atwood & Lathrop, and
the defendants proceeded to pay the same; but on the 24th day of October, when this
suit was brought, there remained due and unpaid the sum of 635 dollars. This was
four months after the defendants had assumed the payment; but the plaintiff had not
been compelled to pay, nor had he paid, any of these claims, nor had he been
subjected to any cost on account of them, at that time. And the questions now put to
us, are, whether the defendants are liable, in this action, for the non-payment of the
balance of the debts unpaid? The cases in which this question is discussed, are not
free from some confusion; and yet the principles deducible from them, or explicitly
decided by them, are clear enough. The confusion seems to have arisen from the want
of a clear discrimination between mere contracts of indemnity, and contracts for the
performance of some act in which the plaintiffhas an interest, from which indemnity,
either expressly or by implication, is to result.

We think an examination of the cases will show these reasonable doctrines; that,
if a condition, covenant or promise be only to indemnify and save harmless a
party from some consequence, no action can be sustained for the liability or
exposure to loss, nor until actual damage, capable of appreciation and estimate,
has been sustained, by the plaintiff. But if the covenant or promise be, to
perform some act for the plaintiffs benefit, as well as to indemnify and save him

A-2

harmless from the consequences of non-performance, the neglect to perform the
act, being a breach of contract, will give an immediate right of action.

5.

6.

Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 102 (1881) (emphasis added):
In the case at bar, the court is therefore unanimously of the opinion that if the
defendant, by deed or other writing signed by himself, had promised the plaintiffs to
pay the amount of the mortgage to Aitken, the authorities are conclusive that the
plaintiffs might have sued him on his agreement, and recovered the whole
amount of the mortgage debt, without proving they had paid it.
Merriam v. Pine City Lumber Co., 23 Minn. 314 (1877) (internal citations omitted)(emphasis
added)
The defendant's undertaking was not one of indemnity. It was an affirmative,
unconditional promise to the plaintiff, upon valid consideration, to pay, within a
specified time, a definite sum of money to a third party - the state - for his benefit.
Though, within the doctrine ofNew York cases upon this subject, as well as our own,
the state might have maintained an action against defendant upon a breach of its
agreement, it is well settled, both upon principle and authority, that the defendant
also remained liable to plaintiff, upon its promise, by privity of contract; and a cause
of action accrued in favor of the latter, which became complete immediately upon its
breach by the failure of the defendant to make the payment at the stipulated time. It
is not necessary for the promisee in this case to discharge the debt before
asserting his right of action against the promisor, growing out of the breach of
his own agreement. The measure of damages in a case of this kind is the
amount of the debt agreed to be paid.

7.

Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 655-56, 62 P. 216 (1900) (emphasis added):
Appellant contends that if all that is claimed by plaintiff is true, yet he is not entitled
to recover the $814.60, because he has not paid the same himself, and because the
agreement was not that appellant should pay the plaintiff that amount, but that he
should pay it to the creditors.

In answer to this it is sufficient to say that the promise to pay the creditors was made
to plaintiff, and that on a failure to keep that promise plaintiff is entitled to recover
whatever damages he has sustained by reason of such failure. He is not compelled to
rescind nor to treat the contract as rescinded, but may rely upon the contract and
recover damages for its breach, and this is, as we understand it, just what he is
endeavoring to do in this suit. His damages in that regard are the same whether
he has already paid the creditors or must yet inevitably pay them. There is no
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question but that he is yet liable to the creditors, and the extent of his right of
recovery is not affected by the possibility that the creditors may not exact all
that they are entitled to in discharge of their claims. The extent of appellant's
liability is the amount that he agreed to pay for the property; and plaintiff can
recover this full amount even though he has not paid it himself. (2 Sedgwick on
Damages, sec. 789, and cases there cited; Banfieldv. Marks, 56 Cal. 185.).

8.

Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895 (1915) (emphasis added):
The contract on which suit was brought was not merely one of indemnity, but
contained a direct agreement on the part of the decedent to pay off and discharge the
notes given by Robertson as fast as they should mature. A failure to pay one of the
notes at maturity constituted a breach of the contract, and the plaintiff could bring
suit thereon. He was not obliged to pay the note before bringing suit. Ifhe was thus
entitled to sue, for what amount could he bring his suit? In Thomas v. Richards, 124
Ga. 942, 53 S. E. 400, where one person entered into a contract with another, by
which he assumed the payment of certain notes made by the latter, maturing at
different dates, the failure to pay any single note was held to be a breach of the
contract, and the other party to it was held to be entitled to recover. In Gage v. Lewis,
68 Ill. 604, it was said:
"Where a bond is given, intended as a bond of indemnity, but containing a
covenant that the obligor will pay certain debts for which the obligee is liable,
and the obligor fails to perform, an action lies for the breach, and the obligee is
entitled to recover the sums agreed to be paid, although it is not shown that he
has been damnified, unless from the whole instrument it manifestly appears that its
sole object was a covenant of indemnity."

9.

Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 711, 75, 76 (1871) (emphasis added):
It is claimed by defendant that his contract is merely to save plaintiff from harm by
reason of his indebtedness, and that, until plaintiff has paid the debt, he is not
damnified, and cannot recover. We have examined the numerous authorities cited
in defendant's brief, and while they are not altogether free from confusion, yet we
think underlying them will be found the following doctrines: That is a condition or
promise be only to indemnify and save harmless a party from some consequence, no
action can be maintained until actual damage has been sustained by the plaintiff. But
if the covenant or promise be to perform some act for the plaintiff's benefit, as
well as to indemnify and save him harmless from the consequences of nonperformance, the neglect to perform the act is a breach of contract, and will give
him an immediate right of action. See Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 116.
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The authorities argee that upon an undertaking to pay a debt due a third
person, the plaintiff may maintain an action without showing that he has paid
the debt. Lathrop v. Atwood, supra; In re Negus, 7 Wend. 499; Port v. Jackson, 17
Johns. 239; Thomas v. Allen, I Hill. 145; Churchill v. Hunt, 3 Denio. 321; Wilson v.
Stilwell, 9 Ohio 467; Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31.
JO.

Turner v. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167, 170-71, 151 P. 751 (1915) (emphasis added):
Such breach having occurred, the party not in default was entitied to recover damages
therefor. The measure of her damages is the amount of the indebtedness, and she
may recover those damages without first paying the mortgage debt. We base this
ruling upon the decision of the supreme court inMeyerv. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, [62
Pac. 216]. It was there held that where, upon sufficient consideration, the defendant
agreed with the plaintiff to pay certain indebtedness of the plaintiff to creditors, that
on a failure to keep that promise the plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever damages
he has sustained by reason of such failure, and that the damages are the same
whether he has already paid the creditors or must yet inevitably pay them. In
the present case the debt which Howze agreed to pay was not an indebtedness of Mrs.
Turner, but was in substance a debt of Howze for which the property of Mrs. Turner
was given as security. There is no difference between this case and Meyer v. Parsons
which can reasonably prevent that decision from being applicable in favor of the
plaintiff here.

11.

Wrightv. Chapin, 87 Hun. 144, 33 N.Y.S. 1068, 1070-7l(N.Y. Gen. Term, 1895)(emphasis
added)
It thus appears that defendant purchased lands from plaintiff, and as consideration for
such purchase agreed to pay Goodwin the debt that plaintiff owed Goodwin, and
agreed to relieve plaintiff of and from all liability to said Goodwin. The defendant,
therefore, has the plaintiffs property, and as the consideration of the conveyance of
the property he agreed to pay a debt of plaintiffs to Goodwin, and to relieve plaintiff
from the liability which he was under to Goodwin; and that covenant the defendant
has failed to perform by failing to pay $22,429.38 of the said indebtedness of plaintiff
to Goodwin. This covenant is not strictly a covenant for indemnity against loss,
but an express covenant to do a particular act, namely, to pay Goodwin the
money due him, and to relieve plaintiff from a liability to Goodwin; and the
damage sustained by plaintiff by a breach of that covenant is the amount of the
liability from plaintiff to Goodwin. ..
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